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6.1  Introduction: The Expansion of Trade Protection in the Midst of 
Trade Expansion 
The trade policy process in the United States is producing dramatically op- 
posite outcomes simultaneously. On the one hand, the United States has rati- 
fied both the North American Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA) and the Uru- 
guay Round, which together include sweeping trade liberalization measures. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of many of those involved in the strug- 
gles over NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, those opposing trade liberalization 
or seeking new trade protection have battled with extraordinary intensity and, 
in significant areas, with some success. How is the trade policy process likely 
to evolve in the post-Uruguay Round era? Will models of policy formation that 
have been useful in the past continue to be relevant in the future? 
This paper examines one of the most vigorously contested areas in the Uru- 
guay Round, the case of  establishing a framework for antidumping actions in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Here, efforts at trade liberalization were 
not successful. In fact, there was an extension and codification of a new protec- 
tionist regulatory regime worldwide, leavened only by  some modest reforms 
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of existing procedures. How did this campaign on behalf of antidumping pro- 
tectionism  succeed  in the midst  of  a major tide flowing in  the direction  of 
liberalization, what does it say about how the process works, and what does it 
portend for the trade battles to come? 
6.2  Models of the U.S. Trade Policy Process 
The basic model of trade policy formation predicts protectionist outcomes. 
Policy making toward trade is an archetypical example of  the collective-goods 
problem (Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1935; Cohen 1988; Baldwin  1985). In- 
tense damage to concentrated groups will prevail over small individual benefits 
to diffuse populations  in generating a policy  response. Trade policy  will  be 
dominated by interests seeking relief through protection in general or possibly 
specifically  through  antidumping. There are three alternative models of  the 
policy-formation  process, however, that contradict the collective-goods  logic 
to predict more liberal policies. 
1. Dejying protectionisni I: An institutional structure for the executive to save 
Congress  from itself: Popularly elected representatives find themselves faced 
by  protectionist  pressures  of  the collective-goods  kind  but  want to do their 
duty in the larger national interest. Congress therefore delegates authority to 
undertake trade-liberalizing  negotiations to the executive, with a fast-track in- 
stitutional structure that allows the executive to save Congress from itself on 
behalf of the greater good. This explains liberal outcomes and would predict a 
split between  the executive and Congress on antidumping, with the former 
winning out on behalf of a more liberal approach. (See Pastor  1980; Destler 
1995.) 
2. Dejjing protectionism 11:  MNC and  big exporter clout  to expand  mut-ket 
uccess abroad. Helping explain liberal outcomes, special interest protection- 
ism is offset by  “special interest” market expansionism on the part of the big 
U.S.  exporter  and  MNC  (multinational  corporation)  trade-and-investment 
community. US. exporters  and MNCs add their pressure from lobbying and 
PAC contributions to the weaker pressures from consumers. This would predict 
strong inside-the-beltway as well as corporate grassroots forces rising to con- 
front those pressing an agenda of more restrictive antidumping laws. (See Des- 
tler, Odell, and Elliott  1987; Hufbauer  1989; McKeown  1984; Milner  1988.) 
A “strategic-trade” qualification to this argument, advanced by Milner and 
Yoffie (1989), suggests that US.  exporters and MNCs may support liberaliza- 
tion, not unconditionally, but only conditionally since they need the economies 
of scale that come from access to foreign markets to compete globally and fear 
the competitive boost that access to the U.S. market might give non-U.S. firms. 
Hence, US. MNCs withhold their support for liberalism at home unless it is 
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where. In the case of antidumping regulations, this “qualification” would pre- 
dict particularly strong U.S. MNC effort to expand market access abroad with- 
out interference  by  antidumping forces in other nations, in return for which 
American  multinationals  help  stifle  domestic  U.S.  antidumping  pressure 
groups. 
3. Debing protectionism III: The broader political and economic interests of 
the American hegemon (even a declining hegemon). Charles Kindleberger and 
others postulate that an open international trading system requires a hegemonic 
power willing to bear a disproportionate  share of the costs, risks, and burdens 
to keep the tendency toward shortsighted national self-interest under control.’ 
The preponderant  power, formerly the United Kingdom and now the United 
States, has a unique time frame and discount rate (“the long shadow of  the 
future”) as well as set of national political interests that predispose it to assume 
system maintenance duties for the benefit  of  all. This would  predict  strong 
efforts on the part of the foreign policy/national defense community to circum- 
scribe antidumping protectionism at home and push for strong multilateral dis- 
ciplines on its spread abroad.2 
A qualification may be needed as American preeminence wanes, according 
to Walz (1979) and Mastanduno (1991). With the decline of American hegem- 
ony, national policy makers may place the search for relative gains above the 
search for mutual gains. They will support the latter only if  the outcome is 
weighted to improve the relative position of the United States. In the case of 
antidumping, this qualification suggests that uppermost in the minds of U.S. 
policy  makers will be the  question of  whether  the  outcome will  leave  the 
United States in a stronger or weaker position vis-a-vis America’s major indus- 
trial rivals. 
6.3  Background on Antidumping 
US. antidumping law was originally intended to supplement domestic anti- 
trust law and address international  predatory  pricing by foreign firms in the 
U.S.  market.  Predatory intent  to  injure was  central  in  the determination of 
dumping. The first  significant change to this original treatment  of  dumping 
came as early as 1921, when a new law omitted any reference to predation and 
provided for a remedy in the form of  antidumping duties whenever foreign 
firms were found to be selling in the United States at less than fair value (below 
the price in the foreign markets or, in the absence of such a price, below the 
cost of production). Importantly, the 1921 law transformed dumping cases into 
I. Kindleberger (1973, 1986) and Goldstein (1986, 1988); Coates and Ludema (1994) provide 
a formal, game-theoretic model of liberalization led by a dominant power. 
2. Prestowitz (1988) presents a more “bureaucratic politics” version of  this argument, that the 
foreign policyhational  defense community weighs in to give away access to the U.S.  market to 
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administrative determinations rather than judicial proceedings, thereby soften- 
ing the rules of evidence and standards of proof. 
Over time, a number of changes have been made in US. antidumping laws 
that have made them increasingly more restrictive. Two changes stand out in 
importance: the increasing reliance on a comparison of the U.S. price of im- 
ports to “constructed value” (an estimate of average cost plus profit and selling 
expenses) and the change in the administering authority from the Treasury De- 
partment to the Commerce Department in order to provide for more sympa- 
thetic treatment of petitioners3  Moreover, the details of the laws and of Com- 
merce’s implementation of the laws have become biased toward finding larger 
margins and therefore more frequent positive dumping  determination^.^ Three 
examples illustrate these biases in the law and its implementation prior to the 
Uruguay Round. First, as the law permitted, Commerce compared a six-month 
average of foreign prices to individual U.S. (import) prices and ignored any 
U.S. prices that take place above the average foreign price when computing 
dumping margins. Thus, an exporter would be found to be dumping unless its 
price on every transaction in the United States is above the average price in the 
exporter’s home  market.  Second, when  Commerce  used  estimates  of  con- 
structed value instead of foreign prices, the law mandated that overhead of 10 
percent and a profit margin of 8 percent be added to fully allocated production 
costs. In contrast, recognizing that competitive firms may set price below aver- 
age total cost for a number of reasons, U.S. courts require that price be below 
marginal cost or average variable cost and that it be possible to recoup short- 
term losses through subsequently higher monopoly prices before a firm’s pric- 
ing practices  run afoul of the antitrust laws. Because the antidumping  laws 
compare U.S. prices to average total cost, and because U.S. firms’ margins are 
often smaller than 18.8 percent, a double standard evolved under which a for- 
eign firm would be found to be dumping in the U.S. market even if it had the 
same costs and charged the same price as a U.S. competitor who faced no legal 
problems. Third, when the exporter failed to provide the information requested 
by Commerce in the format desired, Commerce would use the “best informa- 
tion available” (generally obtained from the petitioner) to compute dumping 
margins. 
In addition to the faulty microeconomics that underlies the U.S. approach, 
the biases in Commerce’s procedures  have become so severe that it reached 
negative determinations in only 3 percent of its final determinations between 
3. The Trade Act of  1974 requires that sales in the exporter’s home market that take place below 
(an estimate of) cost should be excluded from calculations. Not only does this raise the average 
and therefore the resulting dumping margin when price comparisons are used, but it also often 
reduces the number of foreign prices available for comparison by  enough to justify ignoring the 
exporter’s home market prices and comparing prices in the U.S. market to constructed value. The 
change  in administering  authority  took  place  as part  of  congressional  approval  of  the Trade 
Agreements Act of  1979. 
4. The biases in Commerce’s methods are described and thoroughly analyzed in several contri- 
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1988 and 1992 (Arnold  1994). The view that Commerce’s procedures are bi- 
ased in favor of petitioners is shared by a number of US. trading partners and 
led them to push for greater discipline on antidumping actions as part of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. 
The central issue for antidumping in the Uruguay Round was therefore a 
choice  between  attempting  to  circumscribe  antidumping  protectionism  at 
home and  abroad and  legitimizing  the U.S.  approach in the  new  Uruguay 
Round agreements as the standard that would then become commonplace in 
foreign markets. From the beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the 
Reagan and Bush administrations’ negotiators consistently pressed for the lat- 
ter. During the Bush administration, the U.S.  negotiators,  along  with those 
from the European Community (EC), resisted including antidumping in the 
negotiations  at  all. U.S.  negotiators  finally acquiesced  but  consistently  de- 
fended U.S. antidumping practices and, at the end of  1989, formed what Hor- 
lick and Shea call a “non-aggressive pact” to resist changes to either of their 
antidumping practices (Horlick and Shea 1995, 12). The U.S. negotiators never 
attempted to use the multilateral negotiations as an “antiprotectionist counter- 
weight” (Destler 1995). 
The negotiations dragged on well past the initial deadline of December 1990 
owing to disputes on a number of matters. In December 1991, GATT director 
general Dunkel produced a draft agreement to serve as the basis for further 
negotiations. Given the history of U.S. pressure, the Dunkel text did not em- 
brace a sweeping reform of antidumping practices but did include a number of 
restrictions that were aimed at reducing the extent of bias against imports that 
had developed in the United States and elsewhere. For example, the draft re- 
quired that, when conducting antidumping investigations, the authorities com- 
pare average prices in  the home and foreign markets or compare individual 
transaction prices in the two markets (rather than average prices in one market 
to transactions prices in the other market); required that actual data on profit- 
ability (but only on above-cost sales) be used when calculating constructed 
cost; and placed restrictions on the use of the best information available. 
6.4  Determining the Outcome on Antidumping Policy 
6.4.1  Internal Debate in the New Administration 
In principle, the new administration could have reopened the entire spec- 
trum of debate on antidumping, including the constructed-cost/price discrimi- 
nation standard, as might be expected from an administration devoted to ex- 
panding the export potential of the country’s industries. Such an effort did take 
place informally in the summer of  1993, via circulation of discussion papers 
across agencies on a personal basis (a U.S. government equivalent of the sa- 
rnizdat process). But the authors of such documents were quickly tracked down 
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reminded of the requirement  for agency clearance of all such papers, threat- 
ened with exclusion from the deliberative process if they did not play by the 
rules, and warned about the loss of credibility  in interagency  debate if  they 
ventured too far out in front.s 
In practice, then, there was no “bottom-up review” of antidumping  in the 
new administration.  The initial policy battle began from where the previous 
administration had left off, with the more circumscribed but nonetheless sig- 
nificant question of whether to try to shape the new international  regime at 
the margin in ways that would favor consumers and exporters (and economic 
efficiency) or to reinforce the protection afforded domestic producers not only 
in the United States but around the world. 
Beginning in late September, the terms of debate (as defined by the office of 
the U.S. trade representative  [USTR] with the backing of the National Eco- 
nomic Council [NEC]) centered on whether to insist on five major changes to 
the Draft Final Act (“Dunkel text”): standard of review for dispute settlement 
panels; circumvention; sunset; standing for unions; and cumulation. 
1. Standard oj  review. The issue was whether WTO panels should act in a de 
novo or appellate role when considering dumping cases, that is, whether the 
Dunkel text should be reopened to explicitly circumscribe the ability of WTO 
panels  to  reweigh  factual evidence  and  offer  their  own  interpretation  of 
whether national decisions were consistent with a given country’s GATT obli- 
gations.  On the one hand was the argument that WTO panels  constitute  an 
important brake on protectionist  actions by  national authorities. On the other 
hand was the argument that WTO panels might “dismantle our trade laws.” 
2. Sunset. Under then-existing law, a dumping order was terminated only when 
Commerce found no dumping in three successive annual reviews. In practice, 
this meant that most antidumping actions dragged on in perpetuity. In the Dun- 
kel  text, antidumping duties would  end after five years  unless the domestic 
industry could show that it would be injured by  resumed dumping. The ques- 
tion was whether the burden of proof  should be placed on the party found to 
be dumping in the first place or on the party seeking continued trade protection. 
3. Cumulation.  Most countries add  together  imports from different  sources 
when they make an injury determination. The Dunkel text had no explicit pro- 
vision on cumulation.  The issue was whether to reopen the text to make this ex- 
plicit. 
4. Circumvention. The anticircumvention provision in the Dunkel text was de- 
signed to deter the shifting of sources by a multinational firm from one country 
5.  It  is ironic that  Commerce and  the  U.S. trade  representative (USTR) were  reportedly dis- 
cussing noncleared drafts with congressional staff at the same time. 167  Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process 
to another after an antidumping measure was imposed by not requiring a new 
investigation for each country. The question was whether to strengthen the lan- 
guage. 
5. Standing for unions. The concern was whether unions can file antidumping 
petitions. While the Dunkel text did not address the issue of standing for labor 
unions, it expressly allowed governments to permit anyone to be an interested 
party. As in the case of cumulation, the debate centered on whether to reopen 
the text to clarify the right of unions to bring an antidumping case. 
In preparation  for small, deputies-level (generally undersecretaries  or their 
designees) discussions of these issues, the USTR announced that its represen- 
tatives had consulted with  the  Department  of  Commerce, the International 
Trade Commission, the staff of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance 
Committees, and “the trade bar” in order to arrive at positions that could suc- 
cessfully be “sold” to the trade bar and to Congress.h 
Among the materials prepared by the USTR for the launching of the U.S. 
strategy toward antidumping in the Uruguay Round on 28 September, there 
was no attempt to evaluate the substantive effect of the approach being consid- 
ered on the U.S. economy or any discussion of the tactical option of energizing 
exporter and MNC groups to weigh in with their own points of view. When 
discussion papers attempting such an evaluation and suggesting such a tactic 
had been circulated informally in the preceding months, they had been person- 
ally squashed by  the NEC’s  senior trade practitioner  for fear they would  be 
leaked; the rationale was that mobilizing  forces to counter the antidumping 
lobby would merely inflame the latter. 
The survey that was undertaken of  the parties enumerated above indicated 
that  standard of  review  was “the number one issue on everyone’s list.” The 
USTR reported that there was serious concern that panels would reweigh fac- 
tual  evidence and impose their own interpretation  of the agreements, rather 
than deferring to  the original  determination  by investigating authorities. Ar- 
guing on behalf of protecting the integrity of  U.S. trade law, a position with a 
sturdy prosovereignty ring, the USTR urged that circumscribing this standard 
of review, either in the antidumping text or in the Integrated Dispute Settlement 
text, should become the first on the short list of “must haves” in negotiating a 
brokered text. 
The USTR recommended that the United States seek changes in the Dunkel 
text in the other four areas as well, recognizing, however, that the United States 
was “isolated” on these issues among most of the rest of the GATT members 
and at the end of the day might have to settle for less. The Commerce Depart- 
ment and the new National  Economic Council (ostensibly established  as an 
6. From the earliest interagency meetings, rhe  rmde bar- was used exclusively  to refer to the 
petitioners’  bar,  i.e., those  representing  industries  seeking protection  through  the antidumping 
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honest broker for all points of  view) firmly sided with the USTR’s recommen- 
dations. 
Other parts of  the administration  were consistently  antiprotectionist.  The 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), for example, adopted its traditional po- 
sition supporting liberalized trade. The Treasury Department and the State De- 
partment, however, abandoned their historical roles on this issue. Their behav- 
ior defied the  conventional  bureaucratic  policies  dictum, “Where you  sit is 
where you stand.” The Treasury Department, traditionally stalwart in favor of 
freer trade, did not play an active role on Uruguay Round issues, except for 
financial services. The State Department, also traditionally on the side of freer 
trade, was split: the undersecretary of state for economic affairs, however, con- 
sistently decided in favor of those in her department who supported a “strong 
defense of our trade laws.” The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
Justice  generally  supported  the CEA position,  but  the  NEC frequently ex- 
cluded the OMB from key meetings (the OMB would be excluded from one, 
not invited in response to staff-level requests to the next, reinvited to the next 
only when a senior OMB official intervened, and excluded from the next, ne- 
cessitating  a  chip-expending process  for  OMB  subofficials  vis-h-vis  their 
bosses, which they had to conserve for deployment on multiple important is- 
sues). And Justice was shut out completely despite considerable expertise on 
trade laws. 
As for outside pressures, the USTR reported that “the industries supporting 
strong U.S. trade laws remain highly agitated.” Those representing  exporting 
interests, on the other hand, remain “virtually silent.” The only nonprotection- 
ist group whose views are documented at all in the discussions was ECAT (the 
Emergency Committee for American Trade, a group of approximately  fifty of 
the most international U.S. corporations), repeatedly cited as the exception to 
what is referred to as the “consensus.” 
The NECWSTR-led strategy included an explicit plan to share U.S. govern- 
ment intentions with those who use the antidumping laws for protection,  for 
example, “quietly advising the trade bar” on how the administration intended 
to handle what the USTR called “margin-protecting”  issues (provisions that 
otherwise might reduce dumping margins when compared with current U.S. 
practice) and attempting to “sell draft language” on standard of review to the 
trade bar. 
6.3.2  The Geneva Endgame 
During  the  early  debates on the administration’s  antidumping strategy  in 
September and  October,  the  undersecretary  of  commerce for international 
trade, the political appointee with organizational responsibility within the ex- 
ecutive branch for carrying out the antidumping  laws, had not yet been con- 
firmed;  by  mid-November,  as the  Uruguay  Round  endgame in  Geneva  ap- 
proached, he was. His first action as part of the Uruguay Round negotiating 
team in Washington was to make a special request for an “urgent meeting” of 169  Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process 
the deputies at which the U.S. position on the five issues already identified as 
critical would be toughened-in  particular, standard of review, so that GATT 
panels cannot “dismantle our trade laws bit-by-bit”; sunset, so that the burden 
of terminating an order restraining imports be borne by the parties who created 
the problem, the exporters (in the case in mind, of course, non-U.S. exporters); 
and cumulation, so that de minimis thresholds be based on share of imports, 
not share of total consumption. Only in this way could the “broad attack” on 
U.S. law represented by the Dunkel text be countered. In addition, he proposed 
a list of other changes in rules governing start-up costs, constructed value, and 
average prices. 
The senior officials in the US. delegation in Geneva were from the USTR 
and the Commerce Department.  Other agencies  were  represented  by  much 
lower ranks. In private “confessionals”  with Director General Sutherland  as 
well  as public  statements, the changes in the Dunkel draft on antidumping 
were listed as the “number one priority,” once the dispute over the Blair House 
agreement on agriculture was settled. The priority placed on changing the anti- 
dumping text might be expected to have reduced US. bargaining  power on 
other issues, such as enhanced market access, better intellectual property rights 
protection, and/or liberalization of trade in financial services. U.S. negotiators 
claim, however, that there was no opportunity cost for other trade issues from 
placing such high priority on the antidumping changes,’ 
This high priority on the part of the U.S. delegation, in the face of  strong 
international opposition, did not lead the U.S. antidumping interest groups to 
relax their pressures. On the contrary, they managed to mobilize  senior con- 
gressional representatives, including the chair of the Senate Finance Commit- 
tee and the House majority  leader, to fly over to join the lobbying effort in 
Geneva. 
The group most directly advocating the position  of exporters and MNCs, 
ECAT, went to Geneva with only junior members of Congress supporting their 
position. Not only was this side outnumbered and outranked, but it became the 
target of personal attack. After pushing for a sunset clause that made it easy to 
terminate an antidumping order after five years, a senior lawyer on the ECAT 
team was accused by colleagues from the Washington trade law community of 
working  to  undermine  what  would  be  (absent sunset) a stream of  ongoing 
cases.8 
The outcome in Geneva included eight of  the eleven changes demanded by 
the United States. These included circumscribing the powers of WTO panels 
via limits on the standard of review and making explicit the standing of  labor 
7. Horlick and Shea (1995, n. 59) note that a contrary view is expressed by others, including 
Japan’c chief negotiator. 
8. Since antidumping cases generate  more respondents  than petitioners, there is no reason a 
priori to believe that the trade law community is biased toward protection. On the other hand, there 
may  be reason to believe that there is a vested interest among trade lawyers in keeping the anti- 
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unions to bring antidumping cases. In addition, procedural rules were altered 
in a way that would change the results of previous cases, such as the change in 
negligibility. This change was made because the steel industry would have been 
more successful  at the International  Trade Commission (ITC) in the spring 
1993 steel cases under the new criterion than under the old one. The principal 
victory  for the more liberal side was the sunset provision under which anti- 
dumping orders are terminated  after five years unless there is a finding that 
renewed injury would result. 
6.4.3  The Struggle over Implementing Legislation 
Once  the  Geneva  agreement  was  reached,  the  process  of  turning  that 
agreement into legislative language to be approved by  the Congress began. 
Problems were expected primarily in four areas, involving sovereignty and the 
World Trade Organization  (in particular, its dispute  settlement  procedures), 
provision  for renewed  fast-track  authority, parts of  the subsidies agreement, 
and antidumping. Within antidumping, the debate centered on seven main is- 
sues (along with hundreds of ‘‘little’’  ones): “compensation,” awarding any an- 
tidumping  collected to successful  petitioners; “duty as a cost,” adding anti- 
dumping duties to the estimate of the exporter’s cost (thereby doubling  any 
antidumping duties levied); “captive production,” excluding domestic produc- 
tion used internally for further processing when computing import penetration 
and examining industry financial performance for injury determinati~n;~  “aver- 
aging in reviews,” comparing average foreign market prices to individual do- 
mestic prices;l” “exporter’s sales price,”  adjusting  the exporter’s price  when 
sales occur through a U.S. affiliate of the foreign exporter;” “short supply,” 
suspending antidumping duties if the domestic industry was unable to supply 
domestic users with sufficient quantity and quality;’?  and “start-up,” adjusting 
production and sales costs of a new product during its start-up pericd.Ii 
The implementing legislation  was  subject  to  “fast-track”  legislative rules 
9. This proposal was spurred by the assessment that several of the ITC’s findings of  “no injury” 
in the steel cases (especially those involving hot-rolled steel) decided in  1993 would have gone 
the other way had “captive production” been excluded. 
10. This reflects standard Commerce Department practice prior to the Uruguay Round legisla- 
tion and imparts an upward bias to calculated dumping margins unless all prices are identical. The 
Uruguay Round antidumping code prohibits this practice in investigations. U.S. negotiators argued 
that the code is silent on the procedure to be used in subsequent reviews. 
1  I. This proposal would expand dumping margins on goods sold to U.S. affiliates of  foreign 
MNCs by  mandating that the affiliate’s profits and selling costs be deducted from the price at 
which the good was first sold to an unrelated party. No similar adjustment would be made to the 
prices in the exporting country. 
12. Computer manufacturers (Apple, Compaq, Digital, Hewlctt-Packard, and IBM) in particular 
hupported this provision, in part in response to the flat panel display case of  1991. They were joined 
by the Precision Metalforming Association (a group of steel users), Caterpillar, and Michelin. The 
Energy Industry Group supported  the provision because of concerns of shortages of large-diameter 
steel pipe. 
13. The Uruguay Round antidumping code requires that these costs be adjusted to reflect the  -.  .- 
cmts at the end of the start-up period. Two aspects of  this requirement were the subject of contro- 171  Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process 
that prohibit amendments once the legislation is formally submitted and re- 
quire that the entire package be voted up or down. But it is misleading to think 
of “fast track” as a process that prevents congressional changes to the legisla- 
tion proposed  by  the administration.  Instead, any changes need to be made 
before the legislation is formally submitted. The administration’s draft legisla- 
tion (itself the product of negotiations with the representatives of key commit- 
tees and their staffs) is first informally submitted to the relevant  committee^.'^ 
The committees then hold “mock markup” sessions and reconcile the House 
and Senate versions in a “mock conference” to produce a congressional version 
of the package. Only then does the executive formally submit the legislation 
under fast-track rules. 
Although fast-track procedures do not prevent the Congress from influenc- 
ing the  legislative  package,  they  do, of course,  affect the relative power of 
those involved in the implementing legislation. Amendments from the floor of 
Congress  are prohibited,  thus concentrating  congressional power entirely  in 
the relevant committees. And the administration, which submits the final legis- 
lation, can decide which of the changes proposed by  the Congress to accept 
and which to reject  subject to the constraint that the package (and possibly 
other parts of their legislative agenda) be successful. 
A second set of legislative rules-the  “pay-as-you-go” budget rules adopted 
as part of the Budget Enforcement Act of  1990-created  a potential obstacle 
to achieving congressional approval of the implementing legislation. The tariff 
reductions would lead to revenue losses estimated by the Congressional Bud- 
get Office at $12 billion over five years and $28 billion over ten years. Under 
House rules, the five-year revenue losses needed to be offset by other revenues 
or by  spending cuts. Under Senate rules, the legislation would need to offset 
the ten-year losses unless a sixty-vote waiver was obtained. Since the adminis- 
tration was prepared only to propose offsets for the projected revenue losses 
during the first five years, the legislation required a sixty-vote majority in the 
Senate. This budget offset requirement  added to potential opposition to  the 
legislation, and the requirement of a supermajority provided added leverage to 
those seeking to extract concessions in return for supporting the legislation. 
As soon as the  agreement  was reached  in Geneva, domestic  users  of  the 
antidumping laws began to attack the agreement as weakening or dismantling 
U.S. trade laws. This attack was led by representatives of the integrated steel 
producers and the semiconductor industry, two groups that had found the anti- 
dumping laws helpful in the past and that had lobbied for changes in the Dun- 
~~~~~~~  ~  ~  ~ 
versy. On one side, petitioners, led by  the Semiconductor Industry Association, were pushing for 
a5 early an end for the start-up period as possible and for the adjustment to be  limited to tixed 
production costs. On the other side, a group of multinationals led by  the computer manufacturers 
was  pushing  for setting the  end of  start-up at  six  months after normal production  levels were 
achieved and for all start-up costs (production and marketing) to be included in the adjustment. 
14. These were the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee for 
antidumping and for most of  the remaining legislation. A total of eight committees in the House 
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kel  text. In January  1994, Representative Ralph Regula (R-OH), vice chair of 
the congressional steel caucus, proposed fifty changes to US.  antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws. Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) renewed proposals 
to change the calculation of the exporter’s sales price (ESP) when imports are 
made through a related party. Hollings had been unsuccessful in adding these 
proposals to the 1988 trade bill but pressed the administration to include them 
and other margin-increasing changes in the implementing legislation. 
The administration’s efforts on the implementing legislation were again co- 
ordinated by an NEC-led group. Negotiations with the Congress were the re- 
sponsibility of  the trade representative’s  office, joined by  the Department  of 
Commerce on antidumping and countervailing duty issues. The focus of  the 
NEC-led group was on getting the agreement through Congress. Because the 
task  was to determine “what package  can be sold to Congress,” the USTR, 
which was charged with congressional relations, was in a position of providing 
judgments as to what could be sold. Consequently, as both the judge of  what 
could be sold and the agent coordinating  the negotiation  with Congress, the 
USTR effectively controlled the process. 
The administration outlined its approach in a series of memos to the House 
Ways and Means Committee beginning in March. In particular, they chose not 
to embrace several of the proposals being pushed by petitioners, including pro- 
visions for compensation, tighter anticircumvention rules, and instructions that 
the International Trade Commission ignore “captive production”  in its injury 
determinations. They also chose not to include a “short-supply’’ provision that 
was sought by a group of multinationals and energy firms. The administration’s 
outline for the implementing legislation left some ambiguity about “duty as a 
cost” and the treatment of ESP. It proposed that Commerce continue with its 
practice of comparing US.  prices of specific transactions to averages of  for- 
eign prices in computing dumping margins during reviews. 
A “lawyers group” consisting of staff from the trade representative’s office 
and the Department  of Commerce was formed to draft legislative 1ang~age.l~ 
The  staff-level  group charged  with  drafting  the  legislation  had  enormous 
power  to make small but  important  changes to the antidumping laws. Even 
those  aspects characterized  as containing broader,  policy-level  issues  were 
composed of highly technical pieces in what is a byzantine set of laws, regula- 
tions, and practices. Evaluating those policy-level issues required expertise in 
U.S. trade laws that made it difficult for those in the NEC-led deputies group 
who were not trade lawyers to influence the process. More generally, exercising 
effective  control  over the legislative  language from the deputies’ level  was 
largely impossible because of the mind-numbing level of detail, the extraordi- 
nary number of provisions, and the fact that the language was withheld from 
1-5. Adopting the Geneva agreement verbatim was not possible. The agreement is ambiguous in 
H  number of  places,  is silent in others, and permits but does not require some practices. This 
group conducted drafting sessions in close cooperation  with the majority  staff of  the Ways and 
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staff outside of Commerce and the USTR until the summer.I6 Thus, the staff- 
level group drafting the legislation had the ability to tilt the language in the 
direction sought by petitioners, and it did so in several important ways. 
In the first half of April, Representatives Norman Mineta (D-CA) and Ralph 
Regula  (R-OH), the  chairs  of  the  House  Democratic  and  Republican  task 
forces on the GATT, introduced a bill containing implementing legislation for 
antidumping  and  countervailing  duties. Although  slightly pared  down  from 
Regula’s earlier efforts, the bill still reflected the changes sought by petitioners. 
Regula characterized the bill as an attempt to influence the  administration’s 
proposals  for  the  implementing  legislation,  pointing  to  “some  differences 
within the Administration on how restrictive” the antidumping parts of the im- 
plementing legislation would be (Regula was quoted in Inside  U.S. Trade, 15 
April 1994, 6). 
The first complete compilation of the administration’s proposals for the im- 
plementing  legislation was presented to the Ways and Means Committee for 
the 16 June executive session and the 20 June public session of the trade sub- 
committee. The administration’s proposal did not contain several of  the most 
visible provisions sought by petitioners (duty as a cost, circumvention, captive 
production,  or compensation).  Nor did it contain the  short-supply provision 
sought by several large multinationals and computer manufacturers. 
The treatment of costs during a “start-up” phase of  production became an 
increasingly visible issue during the spring. The administration’s initial pro- 
posal was fairly close to the petitioners’ position. The end of the start-up period 
was set as no later than the beginning of  normal production levels, and only 
fixed production costs were to be adjusted. Changing this proposal then be- 
came one of the key goals of those lobbying for less restrictive provisions in 
the implementing legislation. 
Almost  immediately  after the administration  set out its proposals  for the 
Ways  and Means trade subcommittee, a bipartisan  group of  ten members of 
the Ways and Means Committee (six Democrats and four Republicans) led by 
Sander Levin (D-MI) and Amo Houghton (R-NY) charged that the administra- 
tion’s proposals would fail to preserve U.S. trade laws and listed twelve changes 
that they would seek. The list included the familiar issues of  duty as a cost, 
compensation,  captive production, and anticircumvention as well as an early 
end to the start-up period and a weaker injury standard.” 
The Ways and Means Committee marked up the antidumping legislation on 
16. The sheer number of small or subtle ways in which the draft legislation tilted in the direction 
of petitioners presented problems for oversight at a higher level outside Commerce. It is difficult 
to justify deputy-level focus on minutiae, and choosing a few of the most important ones is prob- 
lematic. As one experienced trade lawyer explained, it is impossible for an outsider to know from a 
simple reading of the text which cases or how many cases will turn on a particular choice of words. 
17. The group also pressed for a change in the countervailing duty (CVD) laws that would 
reverse a 7 June 1994 Court of International Trade decision concerning privatized industries. In 
two steel cases, the court overturned the Commerce Department’s practice of allowing past subsid- 
ies  to  “travel” to the new  owners of  a privatized firm. The court ruled that no countervailable 174  Robert E. Cumby and Theodore H. Moran 
20 July, passing  an en bloc amendment that included  several concessions  to 
the Levin-Houghton  group, and rejecting  the computer MNC’s short-supply 
amendment.  l8 The Levin-Houghton group won partial victories on captive pro- 
duction, duty absorption, anticircumvention, and countervailing duties (CVDs) 
on privatized firms. On captive production,  this markup directed  the ITC to 
“focus primarily on the merchant market for the upstream product” to deter- 
mine market share and financial performance. Although a duty as a cost provi- 
sion was not adopted, the ITC was instructed to consider duty absorption when 
conducting sunset reviews and required that, within two years of an antidump- 
ing order being issued, Commerce assess the extent of duty ab~orption.’~ 
Not all the en bloc amendments favored petitioners. The end of the start-up 
period was set “at” (rather than “no later than”) the beginning of commercial 
production levels, and the resulting adjustment had to include “all production 
costs” (as opposed to “fixed costs” only). Also, the averaging of prices in ad- 
ministrative reviews was limited to one month. 
The antidumping issue that proved to be the most controversial in the Senate, 
the calculation of the ESP between related parties, was contained in the “chair- 
man‘s mark” that was presented  to the committee for the markup. Senate Fi- 
nance Committee Chairman Moynihan included language that provided  for 
profits as well as selling costs to be deducted from the price from the first sale 
to an unrelated party. This provision, which had been championed by Ernest 
Hollings (D-SC), would inflate dumping margins by an estimated 7 percentage 
points  or more (Lawrence  1994). The administration’s proposal  (which  was 
approved by the House) provided for a more neutral procedure that would take 
the sales price from the first sale to an unrelated party and then make adjust- 
ments in order to compare that price to the price in the exporter’s home market 
at a comparable level of  trade. 
hubsidy  survived an “arm’s-length” transaction when either an  entire enterprise or a division of 
a subsidized enterprise is privatized. The Levin-Houghton group expressed its desire to “clarify” 
the  law by  codifying Commerce’s overturned practice. The administration opposed  the Leviii- 
Houghton amendments but expressed willingness to “work with the trade subcommittee staff to 
discuss the concerns of  the integrated steel producers” on captive production and said that they 
would “continue to consider” the issue of CVDs and privatized firms. (The quote is from a memo 
lrom the USTR general counsel to acting trade subcommittee chairman Matsui.) 
18. The short-supply amendment was rejected by a vote of twenty-three to fifteen, surprising 
the  large computer company and MNC supporters who, earlier in the week, had expected it to 
pass. The assistant secretary of commerce for import administration voiced strong opposition to 
the amendment. Chairmen Gibbons and Matsui also opposed the amendment. 
19. The assistant secretary of commerce for import administration reportedly told the committee 
that, if duty absorption were taking place, it would “lead us to find an ever higher duty” (quoted 
in  Irtstde  U.S. Trade, 22 July  1994, 21). The en bloc amendment  also states that  a change  in 
ounership of a firm or a division of the firm “does not, by itself require the administering authority 
to find that past countervailable subsidies received by the firm no longer continue to be countervai- 
lablc.” Although this amendment was pushed primarily by the integrated steel producers, it was 
reportedly also supported by Representative Jim McDermott  (D-WA) because of Boeing’s con- 
cernb about the treatment of  subsidies to Aerospatiale, one of  the partner companies in Airbus, 
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On  28 July, the  Finance Committee adopted a  set of  twenty-six  en  bloc 
amendments, including the Hollings ESP proposal that was in the chairman’s 
mark and three amendments similar to those adopted by the House. Price aver- 
aging  in  administrative  reviews  was restricted  to one month, and  language 
on captive production,  pushed  by  Senators Rockefeller  (D-WV) and Hatch 
(R-UT), and on the effect of privatization on countervailing duties similar, but 
not identical, to the House language was adopted. In addition, an amendment 
pushed by Senators Rockefeller and Danforth to restrict “diversionary dump- 
ing” was included in the en bloc amendments.?O 
The House and Senate versions of the implementing legislation then pro- 
ceeded to conference, where the conferees needed to deal simultaneously with 
several contentious issues and with the calendar as well. The House and Senate 
conferees reached  agreement on 20 September, although a few controversial 
issues were left to the administration.”  A House compromise on fast-track au- 
thority did not survive the conference, and fast-track renewal had to await sepa- 
rate legislation. The conference reached a Compromise on the treatment of ESP 
that  provided  for the deduction of  profits  in computing the exporter’s sales 
price (thereby inflating dumping margins), as advocated by Hollings and oth- 
ers, but also included language that may result in more frequent “level of trade” 
adjustments  by  Commerce. The conference adopted the start-up language in 
the House version of the legislation, with the result that the start-up period was 
to end when commercial production  levels were achieved and both fixed and 
variable production costs were to be adjusted. The Senate language on “diver- 
sionary dumping” was also adopted.*’ 
20. According to its proponents, the amendment was aimed at preventing  hot-rolled  steel that 
was under a dumping order from being shipped to another country, where it would be transformed 
to cold-rolled steel and then shipped to the United States not subject to a dumping order. 
2  I. A change in a rule of origin for textiles and apparel-the  country of origin was changed to 
the country where the object was assembled rather than the country where the fabric was cut- 
was included in both the House and the Senate versions of the legislation, but the Senate version 
delayed implementation for five years. A delay of eighteen months (until  1 July 1996) was included 
in the legislation the administration submitted. 
22. The concessions on ESP and textile rules of origin notwithstanding, on 28 September Hol- 
lings announced that the Commerce Committee would use the full forty-five days to consider the 
legislation that fast-track rules allow. The president then asked the Senate to stay in session until 
a vote could be taken, and a vote was scheduled for 1 December. Once the legislation was formally 
hubmitted, the remaining question was whether the required sixty votes would be achieved in the 
Senate. Minority Leader Dole (R-KS) threw up a number of obstacles during the fall. He implied 
that he was conditioning his support on, among other things, a capital gains tax cut, assurances 
that farm programs would not be “singled out” in future budget cuts, and the creation of a commis- 
sion to examine the decisions of the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO. He also requested 
specific commitments for wheat and oilseed producers. An agreement between the administration 
and  Senator Dole providing for the creation of  the Dispute Settlement Review Commission to 
scrutinize decisions  that  go against the  United  States was  announced  on  23 November.  That 
agreement cleared the way for Senate approval of the legislation. The House approved the legisla- 
tion by a bipartisan majority of 288-146 on 29 November. On I  December, the Senate voted sixty- 
eight to lhirty-two  to waive the budget rule and then voted seventy-six  to twenty-four to approve 
the legislation. Senator Hollings was not among those voting in favor of the legislation. 176  Robert  E. Cumby and Theodore H. Moran 
6.4.4  The Dynamics of Trade Policy Formation on Antidumping 
The preceding sections suggest five conclusions about the dynamics of trade 
policy formation on antidumping. 
First, the policy decision-making structure was largely dominated by mem- 
bers of the trade bar practitioner community, owing in part to the structure of 
senior-level appointments and in part to the detailed and specialized nature of 
the subject. This community stretched across the executive and Congress and, 
whether being solicitous of the demands of  petitioners  or attempting to con- 
strain the latter’s demands at the margin, conducted itself so as deliberately to 
exclude more liberal outsiders (in the executive or Congress) as much as pos- 
sible. The few key players who did not come from the trade bar community, 
such as the undersecretary of commerce for international trade, emerged from 
the Senate confirmation process  thoroughly  imbued  with an appreciation  of 
the need to cater to the antidumping petitioners’ lobby. 
Second, reinforcing the strength derived from the technical and specialized 
nature of the debate, the trade law practitioner community enjoyed the consid- 
erable advantage that comes from having captured the rhetorical high ground 
in  characterizing  debate on the antidumping issue. Strengthening  our trade 
laws  became the standard code for awarding protection via antidumping; weak- 
riling  our trade laws became the standard characterization  for policy efforts 
designed to help consumers and exporters. Indeed, the trade bar came to be 
synonymous with the petitioners’ lobby. This victory in the Orwellian struggle 
over use of language reinforced the ability of the trade bar practitioner commu- 
nity to maintain control over the process by handicapping the ability of more 
liberal participants to enlist the support of senior policy makers elsewhere in 
the administration. 
Third, the policy determination process did not start from an assessment or 
a debate about what was in the broadest national interest and then proceed to 
bend  policy  toward  reality from there (initial efforts to proceed  in this way 
were effectively squashed). In fact, except as maverick actions on the part of 
the more liberal policy players, working from the fringes, there was no attempt 
on the part of the principal negotiators (the USTR and Commerce) to “round 
up” countervailing  forces or seek out allies to provide some balance against 
the special interest demands of petitioners. The tactical strategy was to mollify 
and appease the more protectionist forces, with the hope of thereby keeping 
their opposition and criticism within some reasonable bounds. In the process, 
the  idea  that  more  restrictive  antidumping legislation  was  the “price”  that 
needed to be paid to obtain congressional approval of  the full Uruguay Round 
package went from received wisdom to a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Fourth, in this contest, the protectionist interests organized their own forces 
vigorously and well, with an offensive that set the agenda of debate. From the 
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lopsided representation on the ground in Geneva, to the final construction of 
implementing legislation, they mobilized strong supporters from both sides of 
the aisle, while the administration, at best, played at damage control. 
Fifth, those production-oriented interest groups wanting a more liberal out- 
come (like exporters and MNCs) were never represented on as high a level or 
with the same expenditure of resources and energy as their counterparts from 
the ranks of petitioners. Individuals or organizations representing consumers 
or the economy at large were virtually  nonexistent.  Companies that stood to 
benefit from a more liberal approach or to be hurt by the more protectionist 
options tended to concentrate their efforts on a few relatively narrow issues of 
particular concern (like short supply or start-up costs). 
To provide a fuller perspective on the policy-making process, however, there 
is an additional dimension that emerges from examining an initiative to revise 
the antidumping treatment of exports from economies in transition. 
6.4.5  The Economies-in-Transition Initiative: High Politics versus 
Low Politics 
During the debate over implementing legislation, there was a major mini- 
struggle over the antidumping treatment of the economies in transition (EITs) 
that  sheds important light on the relation between  “high politics”  (national 
security, central political relations) and “low politics”  (economic policy out- 
comes, especially domestic economic outcomes). 
Since early  in  the  Clinton  administration,  the National  Security  Council 
(NSC), State Department, Defense Department, and Council of Economic Ad- 
visers had been urging that trade (backed by foreign investment) would have 
to replace aid in fueling market-led growth and reform in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. This prospect was essentially stymied by the biased 
treatment accorded EITs on antidumping. What was needed, therefore, was a 
new method of treating exports from EITs that would be more foreign investor/ 
export friendly. 
To remedy this, the administration’s senior strategist for Russia and the for- 
mer Soviet Union set up an NSC-NEC interagency group with instructions to 
devise options for remedying the situation. At his direction, the group was to 
be chaired by the undersecretary of commerce for international trade, with the 
rationale that no solution could be found that was not supported by the Depart- 
ment of Commerce. (In one subsequent interagency meeting, an assistant sec- 
retary of state previously from the ranks of “the trade bar” broadened this ratio- 
nale by  asserting that the debate on antidumping policy should be limited to 
those who had actual experience in the preparation of  antidumping cases, in 
response to which a non-“trade  bar” official muttered that it was fortunate that 
the assistant secretary of state for human rights, who investigates torture cases, 
did not interrupt interagency proceedings with a comparable demand.) 
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was not a realistic option since a long record of precedents would allow peti- 
tioners to challenge administration of existing laws that were less favorable to 
their claims successfully in court. 
Turning to legislative reforms, the initial option to receive wide support was 
the so-called Heinz amendment, which would shift antidumping cases from a 
cost to a price test.23  EIT exporters would not be found to be dumping as long 
as they sold at the price of  major free market producers. This was vetoed by 
the assistant secretary of  commerce with the argument that the shift to a price 
test not only undermined the viability of using it but was likely to arouse wide- 
spread alarm in the trade bar because of the precedent it might set for broader 
antidumping reform. 
A second option was to shift to reform of 406(D), the safeguard provisions 
concerning imports from nonmarket economies. This would replace antidump- 
ing coverage with a new Section 406 treatment for EITs. The initiative con- 
tained a series of hard-fought-out  compromises. The injury test that was de- 
vised (“a cause of  serious injury”) lay between the easy-to-meet antidumping 
standard  and .the harder-to-meet  current  406  standard.  Injury  would  be  re- 
stricted to imports into the United States, instead of a Commerce proposal that 
Russian exports anywhere in the world could be used as evidence to protect 
U.S. industries. A remedy would be mandatory, but the president would have 
discretion about what type of remedy. The scope of remedy would be to “ad- 
dress” the injury, not to “remedy” the injury (i.e., would not have to compen- 
sate 100 percent). 
The downside to  this  “406 reform”  route  was that  the domestic industry 
seeking protection simply would have only to go once to the ITC to find injury 
and get relief: thus, 406 reform would become one-stop shopping for protec- 
tion. The prevailing antidumping practice requires one stop at the ITC for a 
“preliminary” finding, one stop at the ITC for “final” finding, and one stop at 
Commerce-or  three stops plus international effort to accumulate surrogate 
data. The cost would drop by two-thirds, from $400,000-$500,000 in an anti- 
dumping case to approximately $150,000-$200,000 for a 406(D) case. In sum, 
the (small) uncertainty of protection would be eliminated and the cost of ac- 
quiring it cut by  two-thirds, providing much easier access to a much broader 
array of petitioners. 
Worse, under both 406 “reform” and current antidumping law, the outcome 
in the vast majority of cases would be a VRA (voluntary restraint agreement) 
negotiated  government to government,  thus putting the Russian government 
(and others) right back in the center of developing an industrial policy for the 
new EIT export sector via case-by-case managed trade. 
Even this modest reform, the administration’s congressional  strategists cal- 
culated, would require high-level effort to convince Senate Finance and House 
23. For background on options on exports from nonmarket economies and economies in transi- 
tion. see Horlick and Shuman (1984). 179  Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process 
Ways and Means committee members to accept on geopolitical grounds. In- 
stead, however, the principal coordinator  of  policy  toward  Russia and other 
Commonwealth  of Independent  State (CIS) countries within the administra- 
tion delegated the task of selling the proposal to the assistant secretary of state 
for economic  and business affairs  (who told his colleagues  that he did not 
intend to spend any chips on it); the NSC delegated it to the NEC, the USTR, 
and Commerce; and the Department of Defense (DOD) remained preoccupied 
with other matters. 
As a result, the EIT proposal was introduced very late and, according to staff 
members  on  both  committees,  not  vigorously  pushed  or  convincingly  ex- 
plained by  those assigned the task at the deputies level (cf. Inside U.S. Trade, 
22 July 1994, 11-12);  according to one of the participants, their behavior con- 
stituted a modern-day  version  of “the treason of  the clerks.” The cycle was 
extremely difficult to break: when those in favor of the EIT initiative managed 
to have calls to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means 
Committee put on the calendar of the deputy secretary of  state, for example, 
he delegated the task to the assistant secretary, who in reality was one of the 
“clerks,” because the latter was more familiar with the details and better known 
to committee staff. 
The only principal from the administration to weigh in, at the last minute, 
to try to salvage the initiative was the vice president. With an urgent personal 
phone call, he managed to get it included in Chairman Moynihan’s “mark,” but 
the proposal  was  rejected  by  the  Senate Finance  Committee when  Senator 
Hatch moved to strike it from the legislation. 
6.5  Testing the Models of the U.S. Trade Policy Process 
Evidence from the antidumping parts of the Uruguay Round has its limita- 
tions. Clearly, one case study cannot be used to evaluate models of trade policy 
formation under all circumstances. 
Perhaps the outcome on antidumping was, for example, simply the price the 
country had to pay to get the Uruguay Round completed. Destler reports that 
USTR Strauss viewed the more protectionist antidumping procedures embodied 
in the 1979 Trade Agreements Act as a “tolerable price to pay” for the support 
of the integrated steel producers and their supporters in Congress and character- 
izes USTR Kantor as viewing defense of U.S. antidumping laws as essential to 
his and the administration’s “reputation for toughness and hence its credibility 
for pushing trade expansion” in the Congress (Destler 1995, 149, 241). 
But surely this begs the question. Opposition to the U.S. position  on anti- 
dumping was extremely strong and widespread, especially among the Asian 
trading partners, who themselves were holding out on financial services, indus- 
trial  market access (e.g., glass and zero-for-zeros in copper, wood products, 
and chemicals), and agriculture. So the issue was what kind of a grand bargain 
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antidumping on the table to elicit more generous offers from others, or a re- 
strictive grand bargain, in which the United States “toughed it out” on anti- 
dumping and others reciprocated in areas of special interest to them. 
Perhaps the outcome was, alternatively, merely the result of a tactical error 
of oversolicitousness on the part of the core group of negotiators. Perhaps the 
outcome may eventually appear to reflect, in part, the familiar revolving-door 
phenomenon in Wa~hington.~~ 
There is, however, a general trend of which this antidumping case is a major 
part, namely, the greater ease with which import-competing firms have been 
able to obtain administered protection, over the past two decades, a trend that 
runs counter to the thrust of overall trade liberalization. It may be particularly 
useful, therefore, to assess the fit between the most common models of trade 
policy  formation  and  the  Uruguay  Round  antidumping  case,  with  an  eye 
toward future trade negotiations on issues whose structural characteristics re- 
semble those examined here. 
6.5.1  An Institutional Structure for the Executive to Save Congress 
from Itself 
The principal  explanation  for trade liberalization  since the Great Depres- 
sion, an institutional  split between the legislative and the executive branches 
of government, with the former looking to the latter for ways to save itself from 
its own worse instincts (or simply to get narrow constituencies off its back), 
finds no support in the case of antidumping. Congressional proponents of more 
restrictive antidumping laws were decidedly activist. They lobbied the USTR 
and Commerce repeatedly on antidumping and exacted pledges in the confir- 
mation hearings of political appointees. Prominent congressional supporters of 
more restrictive antidumping laws traveled to Geneva to watch over the Urn- 
guay Round endgame. House and Senate trade committees both played ener- 
getic roles in turning the implementing legislation in a more protectionist di- 
rection.  The intensity  of  the  struggle  over  antidumping policy  was  not  an 
isolated episode; it was reminiscent of the NAFTA battle, which passed with a 
narrow majority and created an acrimonious split in the Democratic Party. The 
administration  did not want to risk a bruising intraparty battle with the Uru- 
guay Round legislation, especially with the administration’s health care legisla- 
tion making its way  through the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means 
Committees at the same time and with midterm elections looming.25 
24. It will be impossible to give an impartial assessment of the revolving-door process for some 
time. Once U.S. trade negotiators have left office, they are barred from representing foreign export- 
ers: they are not barred from working for domestic firms, to help orchestrate their trade strategy 
in  Washington and Geneva, so long as they do not  directly  lobby their  former agencies  for a 
period of  one year. (Also, many of the key players who have taken part in determining policy on 
antidumping policy do not technically qualify as “trade negotiators.”) 
75.  Congressional activism in antidumping policy is not new. Baldwin and Moore (1991). e.g.. 
characterize  it as the best example of congressional efforts over the past thirty years to assert a 
dominant role in trade policy. They point to efforts not only to change the antidumping law but also 181  Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process 
Members of  Congress were  not just active in  a general  sense  during the 
process but engaged in constituent  service. They sought changes in the rules 
that can be readily traced to the interests of particular constituents-frequently 
in an effort to reverse previous decisions that had gone against a constituent.26 
Although Congress did not engage in line-by-line tariff setting, there was little 
doubt about the consequences of  the rule changes that  were sought  (higher 
dumping margins  and more frequent injury determinations) and who would 
benefit from the changes.*’ 
Congressional advocates of more restrictive antidumping laws also exerted 
influence over the executive branch through staff-level appointments. For ex- 
ample, congressional staff members moved to key posts in the new administra- 
tion with the backing of their former employers. Together with the pressures 
exerted through the confirmation process on more senior appointees, members 
of Congress were able to help shape the legislation. 
Was the success of  congressional backers  of restrictive antidumping  laws 
due to  a  lack  of  strong  administration  pressure  that  would  have  served  as 
a counterweight? Once back from Geneva, the administration initially did set 
out to  present  implementing legislation  that  was  generally  faithful  to  the 
Geneva agreement. Even here, however, the interests of  import-competing in- 
dustries were accommodated to some extent by provisions allowed under the 
to influence regulations and procedures and to influence the “nature of the personnel appoinkd to 
political  positions” in Commerce. Destler (1995) acknowledges a history  of congressional activ- 
ism in antidumping that contrasts with Congress’s usual practice of delegating line-by-line tariff 
setting to the Executive. 
26. For example, the change in the negligibility  threshold or the captive production clause would 
have changed the ITC’s ruling of no injury in several of the 1993 steel cases. 
27. Douglas Nelson  (1989) offers an ingenious method to explain the split between congres- 
sional protectionism and executive liberalism while supporting the thesis of what he calls “exe- 
cutive dominance of trade policy.” He argues that administered protection (antidumping, counter- 
vailing  duty,  and  escape clause) alters the  role of  the  legislative  branch  from  engaging  in  a 
distributional struggle in which Congress awards individual industries special favors to pursuing 
what Theodore Lowi calls a “regulatory issue,” defining the rules under which all firmdindustries 
have access to protectionism on the same terms. This transformation undermines the logrolling 
dynamics of protectionist coalitions and allows the congressional dynamic to remain fundamen- 
tally protectionist without derailing the executive’s push for liberalization (which Nelson ascribes 
to the determination of key decision makers, especially in the State Department, to use interna- 
tional trade policy as an instrument of  national  security policy). “In exchange for guarantees that 
no significant  sectors of  the population would suffer sustained injury, the executive branch was 
given the power to pursue a sustained policy of trade liberalization.” 
The antidumping case examined here, however, shows congressional representatives intervening 
on behalf  of  individual industries (steel and semiconductors, e.g.) to put in place  both  a broad 
antidumping regime and particular rules of implementation that will benefit their constituents quite 
specifically, to the detriment of other major sectors of the economy (e.g., exporters and domestic 
users of  imported steel and semiconductors). Nelson’s (1  989) idea  that antidumping regulations 
act as a kind of safety net for the economy as a whole (the functional equivalent of  an  escape 
clause or an adjustment assistance program), whose presence confers permission to the executive 
to liberalize goods and services across the hoard, does not fit the facts as well as the simpler notion 
of  a particularly well-organized and tenacious special interest  group maneuvering to get its way 
at the expense of other sectors and holding their benefits hostage until its interests could be satis- 
fied (or its power negated). 182  Robert E. Cumby and Theodore H. Moran 
agreement (e.g., by continuing to compare average prices to individual prices 
in reviews). Moreover, there was ongoing ambiguity about how firmly the ad- 
ministration  intended  to  hold  the  line  against  protectionist  modifications. 
USTR Kantor made statements that suggested that the administration might be 
flexible on ESP and on captive production. In addition, there were leaks to the 
press to the effect that the administration  was “split” or “not firm” in its an- 
nounced antidumping positions. These reports were no doubt accurate to some 
extent. Historically, the executive has not been unified on antidumping. Indeed, 
Congress pressured the executive to transfer antidumping responsibility from 
the Treasury Department  to the Commerce Department  because  of  the con- 
trasting perspectives  embedded in the two institutions. But public disclosure 
of these splits had the effect of strengthening the hand of import-competing 
interests and weakening the position of those in the administration seeking to 
resist congressional pressures. 
Overall, to fit the policy-formation  process on antidumping, this save-Con- 
gress-from-itself  model would have to be turned not only on its head but also 
inside out: former practitioners from the ranks of the petitioners’ trade bar and 
from  congressional  staffs  entered  the  administration  to  act  as  custodians 
against more liberal tendencies operating there. Their interaction with the Con- 
gress inflated the value of antidumping as an issue and turned the argument 
that it was a deal breaker into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Looking toward the “new trade agenda” on trade and the environment, trade 
and labor standards, and trade and competition policy, how realistic will it be 
to expect that one will find a Congress that wants the executive to brush aside 
its supposed demands and take the higher road toward trade liberalization that 
the members themselves in their secret heart of hearts really do favor as the 
preferred outcome? 
6.5.2  MNC and Exporter Clout to Expand Market Access Abroad 
There is a major mystery why the big U.S. exporters and MNCs did not use 
their influence to offset the antidumping protectionists  (but, rather,  in some 
prominent cases, most notably the semiconductor industry, actually supported 
them). Indeed, their behavior did not even meet the YoffieMilner “strategic 
trade model” test of making access to the U.S. market contingent on greater 
reciprocal  access abroad.  Instead,  they permitted  a worldwide  regime to  be 
codified that would  restrict exports among major production  centers and re- 
strain global sourcing networks. Why were they the dog that did not bark? 
Although  they generally have an interest in liberalized  antidumping laws, 
most large exporters and MNCs have a number of other trade policy objectives. 
The intensity of their interest in antidumping does not match that of frequent 
antidumping law users for whom administered protection is the central objec- 
tive in trade policy. And relative intensity of interest is important in Congress. 
The high priority of antidumping to petitioners  (like the integrated steel pro- 
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who push their agenda. When putting together a sizable piece of  legislation, 
even leaders who generally support more liberal trade want to make problems 
go away. Neutralizing the effect of those who feel strongly about an issue re- 
quires effort and political capital that have an opportunity cost, contributing to 
the idea that doing the right thing on antidumping is a political loser. 
In  general, large US. exporters and MNCs did not match the intensity of 
interest of the petitioners because they were saving their chips for even more 
important items for themselves in the Uruguay Round negotiations than anti- 
dumping. The representations of prominent international companies for whom 
antidumping policy was a potential concern directed the bulk of their lobbying 
efforts toward areas of greater salience for their corporations, such as zero-for- 
zero tariff cuts in their industries, IPR (intellectual property rights) protection, 
or government procurement. When they did weigh in, they tended to focus on 
provisions within the antidumping legislation that would affect their interests 
as importers of  intermediate goods. The Computer and Business Equipment 
Manufacturers  Association  (CBEMA), for example,  concentrated  its  anti- 
dumping lobbying on narrow subissues like short supply (to facilitate imports 
of flat panel displays) or start-up costs. 
At the same time, they had to conserve their political influence for deploy- 
ment in other directions altogether; in particular, they had to expend resources 
to support renewal of most-favored nation (MFN) status for China that could 
otherwise have gone into lobbying on the implementing legislation. They sim- 
ply could not match the single-issue intensity on antidumping of, for example, 
the integrated steel producers. The lack of CEO-level pressure on members of 
Congress from exporters and MNCs was mentioned repeatedly on Capitol Hill 
during the late spring as a reason for the lesser exporter/MNC effect on the 
antidumping legislation. 
Contributing to less intense interest in more liberal antidumping laws is the 
possibility that the interests of some US.  exporters and MNCs may be ambigu- 
ous when it comes to antidumping laws. The U.S. market remains a large one 
for US. exporters and for the MNC community. For some firms, the prospect 
of  using the antidumping laws to attain greater protection in the U.S. market 
may be attractive even if  it might mean that they will be the subject of  anti- 
dumping actions in foreign markets. And, even if they are the subject of anti- 
dumping actions abroad, antidumping laws can act as anticompetitive devices 
that set price floors and enforce collusive behavior and might raise their profits 
in some export markets.28 
In  future trade negotiations, how  likely might  it be that the exporter and 
MNC community  can be more greatly  energized to offset the twin  clout of 
28. Staiger and Wolak (1991)  present  a model in which antidumping laws facilitate collusivc 
behavior during periods of  slack demand when enforcement  is especially difficult. Staiger and 
Wolak (1994a. 1994b) present  evidence consistent with the use  of  antidumping petitions as a 
device to enforce collusive behavior. Messerlin (1990) argues that this is important in the European 
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domestic protectionists and single-interest groups concerned about the envi- 
ronment, labor, and “inside the border” sovereignty issues? 
6.5.3  The Broader Political and Economic Interests of the American 
Hegemon (Even a Declining Hegemon) 
The antidumping case points the trend line in a direction opposite to what 
these models of system maintenance and realpolitik predict. The United States 
did not play the role of hegemonic leader, or “benevolent despot” in Kindlebe- 
rger’s characterization, guiding and forcing the international economic system 
in the direction of liberalization of the antidumping regime. Quite the opposite, 
it guided and forced the international economic system to accept a more re- 
strictive global antidumping regime. 
Nor did the United States play the role of the declining hegemon, calibrating 
its strategy  to produce an outcome that would give greatest relative gains to 
the United States. Because the United States has been the most frequent target 
of  antidumping cases worldwide, the antidumping outcome will hurt U.S. ex- 
porters more than it will foreign exporters.2y  Instead of  producing greater rela- 
tive gains for the United States (per the realpolitik school of Walz and Mastan- 
duno) or greater reciprocity of market  access  for US.-based multinationals 
(the Yoffie/Milner strategic trade qualification), the reverse will be true. 
What is noteworthy  is the ease with which the “high politics” community 
was marginalized, not just on the broad issue of antidumping, but even on the 
specific issue of treatment of products from economies in transition, the suc- 
cess of whose reforms was characterized as the highest foreign policy priority 
of the administration during this period of policy struggle. (This case therefore 
offers a dramatic reversal of Prestowitz’s [  19881 assertion that trade issues find 
themselves subordinated to the diplomatic needs of the national security com- 
munity.) 
To  be  sure, the antidumping debate had arcane elements that could be ex- 
ploited by  the protectionist side in the government. Senior players on foreign 
policy issues declined to weigh in on the struggle over trade reform for econo- 
mies in transition because they were uncomfortable debating the intricacies of 
injury standards or constructed costs, even though the most ardent defender of 
antidumping (the Commerce Department) admitted in writing that the current 
system was hopelessly biased  against EIT exports and could not be repaired 
by anything short of new legi~lation.’~ 
29. Between 1989 and 1993, U.S. exporters were targeted by more antidumping cases than were 
exporters from any other country. Moreover, the use of antidumping laws is growing. As recently 
as 1990. about two dozen countries had antidumping laws. More than forty do now, and several 
others are likely to adopt such laws in the near future. 
30. The director of the policy planning staff at the State Department (a  lawyer) ultimately aban- 
doned the  trench warfare over the tests for injury and causation with the assistant secretary for 
economics (a trade lawyer), even while instructing the staff to continue to highlight U.S. support 
(or market access for Eastern Europe and Russia as a priority  in the speeches of the secretary 
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Other senior players did weigh in, and then faded away, preoccupied with 
other issues. Early in the EIT debate, the undersecretary of defense (later dep- 
uty secretary of defense) stormed into an NEC deputies meeting to which the 
DOD had not been invited, was immediately given the floor, and declared how 
strategically  important it  was  for the United States to  change its treatment 
of  exports from  the  former  Soviet  Union.  The  NEC  deputies nodded  in 
agreement, invited the DOD principal deputy assistant secretary (who was pro- 
fessionally  very  knowledgeable about  antidumping issues)  to the  next  few 
meetings,  and then dropped him from the list when he consistently  failed to 
show up while working on the administration’s flat panel display initiative. 
In coming years, is there greater plausibility that the “high politics” commu- 
nity  of  security  officials in the US. government  will be more  able, or less 
able, to hold the “low politics” agenda of domestic interests and enthusiasms 
in check‘? 
6.6  Implications for Future Trade Policy Making: A “Paradigm Shift” 
in the Making? 
How does the antidumping case study look from the perspective of the com- 
parative literature on policy making in the United States? As one looks to the 
“new trade agenda” of the future, might there be a need for a paradigm shift in 
how the trade policy-formation process can best be conceptualized? 
Trade policy  cannot be  explained  by  economic models of  a government 
seeking to maximize the welfare of its residents. It is difficult to explain either 
the extent of protection or its structure with models of a benevolent, welfare- 
maximizing government. While the trade policy process deflects pressures to- 
ward general closure, it nevertheless still repeatedly produces suboptimal and 
nonmajoritarian  outcomes. Attempts to model the politics of trade policy with 
individuals  voting their rational  self-interest  have given way  to models that 
focus on the role of rent-seeking interest groups with disproportional influence 
via campaign finance when collective goods conditions constrain effective ac- 
tion on the part of the beneficiaries of trade liberali~ation.~’  More recent work 
derives an electoral equilibrium in which each political party acts as if it were 
maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of (informed) voters and 
members of interest groups, trading off extra campaign contributions obtained 
by catering to the interest groups’ demands against the votes that the resulting 
actions might cost them (Grossman and Helpman 1994). 
The comparative literature on public policy making adds a further dimen- 
sion by focusing less on electoral politics per se and more on the conditions 
surrounding agenda setting, decision making, and policy implementation. The 
antidumping case illustrates how  important this policy-formation  dimension 
3 I. Baldwin (198.5)  and Krueger (1993) survey the development in the economics literature of 
the  political economy of commercial policy. Krueger (1995) examines the political economy of 
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can be for understanding  protectionist  outcomes. This dimension  is likely to 
be all the more prominent in the struggle over the “new agenda” trade issues. 
This comparative  literature on public policy formation  yields three rather 
somber insights. 
First, collective-goods  problems are prominent  in understanding  not only 
who does not take an active part in policy struggles but also who does take an 
active part. In the face of relative passivity on the part of many who are widely 
dispersed and only mildly affected by  a particular policy outcome, there is a 
propensity to find the terms of the debate, the posing of alternatives, the tactics 
of maneuver, and the selection of policy makers to be dominated by  “volun- 
teers,” who differ from the general public  in their zeal and commitment to 
single issues and in their unwillingness to compromise easily for a more gener- 
ally accepted definition of the common good. 
The literature that analyzes this phenomenon  tries to explain perverse out- 
comes in electoral campaigns (why do the primaries produce candidates and 
candidate positions  at variance with  what  is desired  by  the majority  of  the 
electorate?), in budget debates (why is a particular category like social security 
sacrosanct?), and in controversial  issue debates (why was the majority-sup- 
ported Equal Rights Amendment defeated? why is the minority-supported pro 
life position so often a litmus test?) (cf. Mansbridge  1986). 
In the antidumping case, owing to the domination of the Orwellian debate 
by  the protectionists,  there was a certain element of “true believer” zealotry 
about the need to defend the integrity and sovereignty of U.S. policy against 
the ”unfair” practices of outsiders. In the “new agenda,” the proponents of the 
protectionist side of the debate are likely to find it easy to capture the rhetorical 
high  ground  and motivate  dedicated  efforts  on the  part  of  those  who feel 
strongly about the environment, labor standards, or sovereign control over do- 
mestic issues like competition policy.i2 In contrast to antidumping, the environ- 
mental and labor agendas on trade have genuine substantive reasons to appeal 
to supporters as well as serving as cover for protectionists. 
In short, the collective  goods problem is likely to  show up on the  “new 
agenda”  trade issues with doubly perverse consequences, generating  single- 
interest true believers  from within  the hard-to-mobilize  general  public  plus 
concentrated special interests from within the easy-to-mobilize sectors threat- 
ened by trade liberalization, both on the side of greater protection. 
Second, the comparative literature points out a tendency to form “networks” 
of  like-minded supporters  across agency boundaries,  carefully  vetted  in the 
confirmation process, who combine expertise and determination  in pursuing 
their objectives  and excluding outsiders,  in a policy-making  milieu  that has 
become more decentralized and fragmented over the past several decades. 
32. The rhetorical high ground is surprisingly important. Destler and Ode11 (1987, 73) found 
that activity in opposition to trade restrictions was “significantly lighter or absent” in cases “where 
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In the past, the most prominent power structure that perpetuated outcomes 
favorable to specific interests was the mechanism christened the “iron triangle” 
consisting of congressional committee chairs, well-financed lobbies, and well- 
placed bureaucrats. This has fit well with the conventional conception of rent- 
seeking behavior.  Now that two decades of congressional  “reform” have cut 
back the power of committee chairs while proliferating the numbers of  com- 
mittees and subcommittees themselves and political appointees have replaced 
career civil servants more widely in policy-making positions within the execu- 
tive, the newer methodology  in the political science literature is to show how 
special interests have narrowed their demands and created “networks” of com- 
mitted  supporters throughout  a much more complex  governmental  environ- 
ment than existed in the earlier era (Heclo 1978; Browne and Paik 1993).” 
The study of U.S. agricultural policy, for example, once relied heavily on 
the use of the “iron triangle” metaphor. As agricultural issues have been appor- 
tioned in a Congress and an executive that is more decentralized, with overlap- 
ping jurisdictions for aspects of farming that pertain to the environment, con- 
servation, energy, consumer protection, and international competition as well 
as agricultural production, the tracing of painstakingly placed networks of sup- 
porters and sympathizers has become more prominent in explaining outcomes 
(Browne and Paik 1993). 
In the antidumping case, presided over by  the watchful eye of the congres- 
sional confirmation process, the deployment of a set of decidedly nonneutral 
policy  players  across  agency  lines  made the prospects for participating  in 
interagency debate on antidumping issues,  let alone wresting  control  of  the 
outcome from the “network,” exceedingly difficult and unlikely. In the “new 
agenda,” the networks arrayed against trade liberalization (to extend the previ- 
ous argument) will be double strength, combining single-issue “true believers” 
with opportunistic protectionists. The new trade issues community of environ- 
mentalists and labor representatives cum threatened industry interests will be 
ready and eager to field a team of spirited and determined veteran practitioners 
in the policy-formation  process; the freer trade community is less likely to be 
similarly prepared or energized. As a consequence, the appointments process 
is likely to constitute a microcosm of this collective-goods problem: high-level 
political  appointments matter, and true believers will ally with concentrated 
vested  interests  to get sympathetic  and reliable  individuals  in place  for the 
battles to come. One might predict, therefore, that the appointments process 
33. The literature on “iron triangles” and “networks” has important implications for the analysis 
of rent-seeking behavior. Models of the latter tend to assume that protectionists have to mobiliLe 
and expend enough resources to affect aggregate electoral outcomes. But, clearly, this is too high 
a hurdle. Instead, special interests seeking protection have to dispense just enough rents to nurture 
an iron triangle of congressional committees, related agencies, and affected industries or, perhaps 
even  less, to maintain a network  of  committed  activists just  strong enough to logroll  or back 
scratch successfully on behalf of their sponsors. In short, a little bit of rents may be able to go a 
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itself will be vulnerable to “capture” in the way that the antidumping case illus- 
trates. 
Third,  far from finding Congress deliberately ceding control over policy out- 
comes to the executive in the interest of protecting the broader “national inter- 
est,” the comparative literature on policy formation shows determined efforts 
by Congress to create structures and processes that are deliberately designed 
to insulate policy outcomes from the broader “national interest” test. 
Three cases highlighted in the comparative literature, for example, are the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration  (OSHA), the Environmental 
Protection  Agency  (EPA),  and  the  Consumer Product  Safety Commission 
(CPSC) (Moe 1989). Their formal structures vary greatly: OSHA is carefully 
buried within a presumably friendly agency, the Labor Department; the CPSC 
is an autonomous regulatory commission, a form strongly desired by consumer 
advocates despite (or perhaps because of) their observation over the years of 
the vulnerability of commissions to capture; the EPA is an independent agency 
with a mandate theoretically covering the entire economy and society. But, in 
each case, their supporters created them precisely to give them insulation from 
and superiority  over efforts to make their actions mesh with broader concep- 
tions of  the public  good (Chubb and Peterson  1989). Their supporters have 
established them to serve particular interests, undeterred by future congresses 
or presidents with a different agenda. 
The antidumping case clearly falls into this subgroup of structures and pro- 
cesses that is difficult to harness and control on behalf of  the greatest good for 
the greatest number, with the ITC an independent agency and the Commerce 
bureaucracy forming a quasi-independent apparatus, bolstered by administra- 
tive  procedures  and judicial  rulings.  Even  a  president  must  expend  large 
amounts of capital to bring about change. The same is likely to be true on “new 
agenda” issues. 
Moreover, on any issue that is at all technical, where there are contrasting 
opinions that  are not the most  blatant  traditional  protectionism  (i.e.,  not  so 
blatant and simple as to set off  1930s-analogy alarm bells), the high politics 
community, inattentive and busy with other serious national  security  issues, 
is quite vulnerable to being  marginalized,  at least  until  faits accomplis are 
accomplis. 
As a consequence, therefore, in contrast to a stylized division between the 
executive and the Congress, with the former staunchly upholding trade liberal- 
ization with the tacit approval of  the latter, there will likely be intimate links 
created with executive-congressional appointees advocating protectionist mea- 
sures  and turning  market-opening  possibilities  into deal  breakers  whenever 
they are pursued. Analytically, the notion of a congressional-executive  split, 
with the executive pursuing  the broader  common interest  and offsetting the 
protectionist impulses of the Congress, is likely to vanish as a useful model for 
much of the trade policy-formation  process. 
This might well suggest considerable pessimism about making much trade- 189  Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process 
expanding progress on the “new agenda,” unless proliberalization forces, in- 
cluding the MNC and big exporter community, can be mobilized and energized 
as an effective counterweight to more market-closing pressure groups in the 
formation of trade policy. 
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